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Nthakeng Selinyane*
This paper looks at the po ten tia l o f  building a civil society which can contribute to 
strong democracy in Lesotho. It argues that civil society in independent Lesotho has 
been stunted by dominant po litica l and intellectual discourse in which it evolved, and 
that this discourse must be transcended i f  viable dem ocracy is to be attained. Historical 
factors which have arrested  the growth o f  civil society are discussed, and possibilities 
for transforming the p o litica l landscape from  below assessed.
Introduction
The 1980s and 1990s were decades o f  intense political struggles for retrieval1 
of democracy in Lesotho. Having lived through years of single-party followed 
by no-party rule and deteriorating quality of life, the country’s working classes 
were increasingly coagulating into a broad front to bring down 
authoritarianism. The collapse o f BNF rule in 1986 concretised this focus as 
the traditional party political schisms o f the social groups fell away. The 
bonapartist complexion o f  despotism rekindled the consciousness of the subject 
classes as natural allies in their struggles against an autocratic state. The 
question remained, however, whether this consciousness would survive 
democracy and restoration o f  electoral politics. This article looks at the 
patterns of state-civil society relations through which this question was tackled 
in practice in the first five years o f  elected government from 1993 to 1998. It 
further assesses the prospects for building modes of government based on the 
people’s control and limitation o f  repressive powers of the state in the future.
In the current political and academic discourse this task has come to be 
assigned to the realm o f  independent social organisations commonly referred 
to as civil society. The term civil society has been variously appropriated in 
political discourse in the last few years2. Civil society as construed by this
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author refers to organised sectors of society, in any form and tor any purpose. 
It is differentiated from the general term "society" which broadly refers to all 
members o f  a polity. Civil society cannot be construed in terms of 
"progressive" civil society alone as the experience discussed in this paper will 
illustrate. Further, civil society cannot always be "progressive", there are 
numerous objective and subjective conditions which impinge on its composition 
and orientation. Civil society has to be distinguished from political society, 
which comprises formations brought into being specifically to pursue a political 
agenda as opposed to the largely (indeed purely) socio-economic mission of 
civil society.
What makes civil society an essential ingredient o f democracy is the fact that 
democracy must be seen to improve the lives o f the people, to allow for self­
exertion and release o f  people’s creativity in the transformation o f society for 
the better in all spheres o f  life (see Wamba-dia-Wamba 1994a). For this end 
to be attained, restrictions imposed by the state on the individuals and groups 
(peasants, craftspersons, workers, businessmen, professionals) must be 
minimal. Being of such motley make-up, civil society is the one sphere capable 
of pushing back the restrictions of the state on societal groups, and pushing out 
for the simultaneous expansion of the competing interests o f  the various sectors 
of civil society in this regard. It follows from this conception of the question 
that (i) civil society stands outside the state and political society, and (ii) the 
state must be seen as a contested space, it must not be required to stand ab 
initio on the side of the oppressed; nor can it be blamed for "failing" to do so. 
Its character is in the final analysis given by the freely contesting balance of 
interests of the disparate civil society constituencies.
Civil Society and the Politics o f Self-Restraint
The processes through which the organisations which would be expected to 
comprise the core o f popular civil society came to fail or achieve this task can 
be traced to the emergence of the political party as the nation-wide vehicle for 
mobilisation of the people to take on the colonial state and capture power by 
the local classes. While the first civil society organisation (the Basutoland 
Progressive Association) predated the first political movement (the Basutoland 
African Congress) by more than four decades, in their emergence the political 
parties came with a message that was more compelling to all classes of the 
subject people. In place of the "localised" and "particularistic" struggles of
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civil society formations, the political party message had a messianic ring - it 
promised to scatter colonialism to the wind, and solve the problems o f all 
classes of Basotho in one stroke. While the political party did not immediately 
squash and replace or displace the existing civil society organs, it coexisted 
uneasily with them for a brief period, contesting for power and influence over 
the same social constituencies. Through direct occupation of the leadership 
structures o f  the labour movement (the most visible civil society of the time) 
by party leaders, formation o f new unions, and imposition of party priorities 
on union programmes, the nationalist movement rapidly incorporated the civil 
society and thereby weakened its position vis-a-vis a future independent state. 
Through an aggressive programme of entrepreneurship where many middle 
class members o f  the BAC were encouraged to form small businesses 
(especially in the retail and wholesale sectors) the nationalists were also able 
to create a stable, loyal commercial civil society.
The role o f  capturing the state was seen as belonging to those who prescribed 
it for themselves - the political party. The familiarity with the (liberal) 
discourse of rights, freedoms, representation, self-determination, all made the 
middle classes see themselves as the natural leaders o f  the process o f capturing 
the state on behalf o f  the rest o f  the population. While the essentially 
economic struggles o f  the independent organisations continued and proliferated 
in the decade to independence (Southall 1984), a question may be asked: to 
what extent were these politically motivated, and not entirely and immediately 
to do with the w orkers’ economic conditions; to what degree were they 
directed at the colonial state, not colonial capital, without adequately 
emphasising the link between these two? To put the question slightly 
differently, to what degree had the political party introduced formal politics 
into labour without introducing labour to formal politics? Subsequent 
experience was to show that labour had been drafted into macro-politics 
without negotiating the terms of that engagement(Southall 1984). In this way 
whereas labour was highly mobilised and organised, it still fell short of 
constituting a building block o f  civil society. To the extent that their economic 
struggles did not combine with the political resolve to compel the state to fulfil 
their demands; and to the extent that their involvement in political campaigns 
might have lacked specific economic demands - they remained organised labour 
but increasingly lost attributes that made them constitute a civil society.
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It was in this state that the country entered independence with a civil society 
that was largely incorporated3 (into the political movement), forming the hub 
of BCP support. Thus the BNP did not have an incorporated civil society 
through which to control society after assuming power as the first 
independence government. Unable to hammer consensus and mould hegemony 
(due to the weakness o f  its influence in civil society), the BNP state resorted 
to a two-prong strategy of state coercion and creation ot its own "parallel 
civil society" by deliberately financing alternative trade unions and labour 
federations, forming youth clubs. Thus one can talk o f two tiers of civil society 
for most part o f  Lesotho’s post-colonial history - that which came into being 
independently under colonialism but ended up being incorporated into the BCP, 
and that which came into being largely through state efforts under BNP rule 
and stayed close to the ruling party and the government. To the degree that 
most of the division of labour organisations which evolved after independence 
remained in this rut, weaving themselves around the main political parties, but 
did not command the resolve to impress their interests on the programmes of 
these parties, they fell short of forming a civil society. Their contiguity to the 
political parties, both inside and outside government, made these organisations 
to variously be uncritical of the state (in the case of pro-BNP organisations) or 
to mount criticism and resistance to state with a greater cue from party politics 
without sufficiently emphasising the everyday needs of their members, thus 
accentuating their vulnerability to state persecution (in the case of pro-BCP 
organisations). For convenience I will refer to the former as the first generation 
of civil society groupings, and to the latter as the second generation. The third 
group of organisations which appeared in the 1980s and 1990s without 
alignment to any political party, I will refer to as the third generation 
organisations. These designations do not imply, however, that these 
(categories of) organisations do not exist side by side today.
The 1993 Transition and the Politics o f Retrieval
I take the transition4 period in Lesotho as the years between 1988 and 1993, 
when the struggles by the working classes escalated, first in the economic 
realm, and increasingly assumed a political tone, which challenged the 
legitimacy of the military. This period witnessed the appearance o f many self- 
help organisations, influenced in part by the donor conversion to NGOs as 
funnels for dispensation ot aid'. The economics of the transition in Lesotho 
has been so copiously discussed as to merit no repetition here (Selinyane
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1996a, 1996b, 1997a; Weisfelder 1992; Sejanamane and Santho 1991). While 
controversy may surround the explanation o f the generally hleak performance 
of the national economy in this period, there is sufficient consensus on the 
problems and the challenges. What must briefly arrest my attention, however, 
is the explanation o f the transition politics. Much of the recent literature tends 
to lay a greater emphasis on the external factors (donor political conditionality, 
the crumbling o f  apartheid, developments in Eastern Europe and the end of the 
cold war) as motive forces o f  the transition (Makoa 1991; Matlosa 1996). 
Where local factors are substantially considered, the retina of analysis tends to 
dwell on the political parties and their leaders on the one hand, and the military 
on the other, to the exclusion of civil society groups (Sejanamane 1991; Mahao 
1992; Matlosa 1996). Two factors might explain this bias. First, community 
organisations, where they mounted struggles which dealt an impact on the 
political regime, initially refrained from making explicit political demands in 
their everyday struggles, except on occasional common gatherings like the May 
Day which increasingly became a political platform. Second, when the 
transition process began to take shape, particularly after the formation of the 
Advisory Council on constitutional review in 1990, these formations 
increasingly patrolled themselves out o f  direct active politics, so that their 
career in politics was very short-lived in the period since independence. 
Deliberate attempts by scholarship to understand this trend and its implications 
for democracy have at best been cavalier. Hence the formulation of the "best" 
relations between the political parties and community organisations in the 
transition and between these organisations and the state in conditions of 
political liberalisation remained beyond the scope of academia.
The initial fissure along loyalties to existing political parties compelled those 
organisations to consciously eschew tackling the political questions appertaining 
to their specific interests. Indeed, for a moment the military was tacitly 
accepted as an arbiter. The main weakness o f  this option was in conflating 
party political affiliation for a general adoption of a political stance on 
economic matters - i.e emphasising the advancement of their economic interests 
as the only basis upon which support to party politics may be rendered, and 
acting as a collective to advance this perspective. For first and second 
generation formations, this "safe" posture was only masking a "waiting in the 
wings" for one’s own political party to come back into the tray upon 
liberalisation of the political field, so one could emerge from the trench and
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celebrate the reunion with the same unreliable party elites without imposing 
any conditions for further support.
This pose o f the civil society organisations under the military was an 
acknowledgement that individuals belonged to diverse political affiliations 
‘permanently’ and ‘unconditionally’; and that since these affinities could not 
openly contest for hegemony over society in conditions of illegality it was 
futile to profess allegiances which could not be mobilised to fight immediate 
struggles for daily survival. It was found wiser to maintain minimum coalitions 
against military repression, and look forward to the return of politics (political 
parties) as the sole mode to resolve the entire spectrum of social, economic and 
political ills visited on these groups over the years. As long as they remained 
hesitant to take a political stance on their interests, they remained a 
conglomerate o f  loosely-held-together individuals with largely emotional 
political affiliation, but incapable o f trading this political affiliation for a party 
political pledge to minister to their needs. It was natural therefore that with the 
restoration o f party politics the individuals in these organisations reverted 
unconditionally to their old affiliations. This reluctance to act in a politically 
conscious manner in the context o f  the transition engendered their 
susceptability to party political manipulation during and after the transition.
Civil Struggles and the Politics o f the Transition
Numerous struggles took place, mainly on the industrial plane, which 
galvanised forces for change in the transition period. The commencement of 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) around which major labour 
struggles in the private sector were to be fought, coincided with arrival back 
home of experienced trade unionists expelled from the RSA during the 1987 
mineworkers strike. This augured well for unionisation o f the LHWP 
construction workforce, and consequent struggles around the project provided 
fuel for unionism elsewhere. The 1990 teachers’ strike climaxed in the 
formation of the Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU) which proceeded to 
become one of the most important components of the labour struggles in the 
period beyond the transition. The National University of Lesotho Academic 
Staff Association (NULASA) took an explicit political line and intermittently 
called on the regime to step down; while wildcat strikes escalated in the public 
sector (Lihale 1991). Youth and students protests became particularly strong 
and expressly called for restoration of multi-party electoral politics. The rural
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areas, where forms and means o f oppression are more subtle, were the only 
sector left without dramatic, organised struggles with the state. Rural forms 
and modes o f resistance and struggle have been discussed elsewhere (Selinyane 
1996c) and will not be touched on here.
Several outstanding features characterised the struggles I am concerned with 
here: first, the organisations which waged these struggles were not ready to 
take power in their own name, but they also lacked a ready agenda to impose 
on an emergent government, or mechanisms for controlling and limiting the 
power of such government. Consequently when the field opened they 
remained outside the pale o f the process they had so greatly exerted an impact 
on hrigning about, and they did not have any influence on the outcome. Only 
the Construction and Allied Workers Union of Lesotho (CAWULE) and its 
cohorts explicitly put forward the option of workers’ direct contest for state 
power, and ultimately formed the Lesotho Labour Party which contested the 
1993 elections, but did not receive substantial support by the working classes. 
Secondly, while simultaneous struggles o f  organised groupings took place, one 
cannot talk of the existence o f a labour movement in the country during the 
transition. The efforts were scattered, and attempts to form a single national 
trade union federation transcending the old divisions running along the 
BNP/BCP rift repeatedly failed during the transition. Opportunism, power 
struggles, and financial corruption leading to conspiracy and bribe-taking were 
rife even among the proponents o f  an alternative labour federation. Thirdly, 
the transition was rushed through hastily, without settling points to guide a 
future democratic dispensation, and when the parties took the field to the 
exlusion of division o f labour groups, this sealed the exclusion of these groups 
from the benefits o f  the ensuing democratisation. This was made possible by 
the deliberate decision o f  these groups to opt out of politics as organised 
groups and entrust their fate as individual persons to the political dictates of the 
parties.
The Flawed Transition: Intellectual Debates versus Popular Demands
The processes for (re-)introduction o f multi-party politics assumed different 
forms in different parts o f  the continent with different colonial past. The 
former British colonies were prodded by the Commonwealth and whipped by 
the ODA (Commonwealth 1991; Allen et al 1992; Baylies and Szeftel 1992; 
IDS Bulletin 1993); the French speaking part were nudged by the National
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Conference starting with Benin in 1989 to the Zairean setting which foundered 
over a period o f five years until Mobutu was removed by guerilla means (Allen 
1992); while the Luso-phone zone became the chip of superpower political 
bargaining as in the Mozambican and Angolan cases. Some cases, like the 
Lesotho process, combined some elements o f  the different approaches. With 
the collapse o f  state credibility (Selinyane 1996a) and the rolling crisis, the 
military was forced to make a public commitment to trasfer power, and a 
national conference was held in October 1991 to fashion an agenda ot 
transition. In 1995, amidst a protracted national crisis of irresponsible elected 
government (Selinyane 1996a, 1997a), a second national conference was held 
in September. Although these processes have been discussed before (Selinyane 
1996a) my present purpose is to problematise the national conference as an 
arena for moulding a coalition of interests and fashioning the character ot the 
state within confines o f negotiated (elite) compromises. I will demonstrate that 
despite their criticism of the 1990-92 Advisory Council the intelligentsia did 
not propopse any alternative to it, the national conferences for which 
intellectuals became important midwives were a prosecution of the same agenda 
by other means.
The transition in Lesotho came at a turning point in modern global political 
economy where the regime of global capital accumulation had been drastically 
changed through the structural adjustment regiment of policies6, relying on 
despotism for their execution (Callaghy 1986; Hiemenz and Funke 1994; 
Chomsky 1987), and deliberately fostering authoritarianism, graft and 
cleptocracy in their trail (Crisp 1994; Lawrence and Seddon 1990; Marshall 
1990; Tickner 1992; Rudebeck 1990; Matlosa 1990; Seddon 1986). Having 
wrought havoc on the lives o f the ordinary people in the Third World through 
adjustment, the IFIs and western capital found it fit to legitimate their 
programmes through institutions of formal democracy (seen as the existence of 
freely competing parties, an elected parliament resultant from regular elections, 
subordination of repressive state apparatus to the executive); and resuscitation 
of civil society construed as the (usually unaccountable) charitable non­
governmental ogrnasations7. This was the orchestrated framework that needed 
challenging. Only a consistent rebuttal of the limited IFI/donor conception of 
pluralism and democracy and all that it entails, and only a consistent posing of 
a popular alternative would address the demands o f the common people in the 
processes of transition. It is precisely these challenges which the intellectual 
and political discourse shunned.
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The 1991 and 1995 National Conferences
Two points warrant mention about the 1991 conference. First, that it became 
especially obsessed with issues o f  a choreographed national reconciliation 
(among party political leaders) whose parameters were not determined by the 
ordinary people. Second, the conference was conducted under the stewardship 
of the elite experts (mostly from the National University) who were brought 
in to interpret history and carve the field for transaction of business. The 
transition was thus managed within narrow bands of a petit bourgeois 
discourse, its focus remained largely on the constitutional stilts on which a 
democratic order was to be founded, and not on bringing the people back into 
the political process. Constitutionalism was viewed as existence of modern 
independent, separate and mutually exclusive, counterbalancing institutions. In 
this package, the role and place o f the people were marginal, defined by the 
constitution and the legal process. The exigency to establish new forms and 
modes of interaction between the governors and the governed was obviated; the 
only definition o f democracy was from above, and the popular classes did not 
inform its interpretation and its materialisation.
The discourse o f the conference also reduced democracy to economic growth 
a la modernisation perspectives. The absence of democracy was often blamed 
on lack of means o f survival, and the limited means of self-sustenance and 
accumulation outside the state. This was in part following radical theory which 
saw the creation of capitalism - and thereby the rise of a class of independent 
entrepreneurs not dependent on the state for its self-reproduction, limiting the 
space of the state in the economic sphere - as a precondition for liberal 
democracy (Mamdani 1987), complemented by bourgeois theories which 
prescribed liberal (i.e capitalist) democracy as the sole mode of democracy for 
the emergent states after World War II(Wamba-dia-Wamba 1987; O'Brien 
1972). Hence the need for state to do development in order to cultivate 
democracy was emphasised. The clear mechanism by which the state was to 
(be compelled to) do this were left to the mere fact that the government would 
have been democratically elected. Thus the specifically political aspects of the 
transition were by and large left unattended, and the conference remained an 
intellectual exercise in blunting the radical edge of the subjected groups and 
concluding deals above their heads, contrary to its pretensions to be a national 
dialogue for popular resolution o f problems of lack of democracy.
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For many ideologues the country s economic dependence spelt political 
dependence and fragility of the state, making it unable to confer collective 
values and fashion national consensus (Weisfelder 1967: 6-7; Makoa 1995a: 
4-5 & 1995b: 34); the remedy for instability and economic depression was 
creation o f a strong state. This statist view is resonant in Makoa (1990) who 
perceives democracy as a mere game of numbers, failing to root his analysis 
in the social relations among people and the political relations between people 
and the state:
The current political agenda in Lesotho includes representation and 
accountability .. .  at the centre o f  L esotho’s political turmoil is lack o f  politics 
- a free and com petitive dem ocratic political process in which individuals and 
political parties arc free to com pete for power ... The king and the military 
Council were presented with the challenge to rebuild the nation ... [P |eop le  
took to arms to back up their demands for unbanning o f  politics. T his 
unbanning o f  politics would greatly im prove the im age o f  the army ... and the 
king. Both would be hailed as saviours o f  the nation" (p. 3 5 ) \
Those acquainted with the nation-building project of the Lesotho state 
(Selinyane 1996b) and elsewhere on the continent (Olukoshi and Laakso 1995) 
using development, absolutism, cannot help being scared by this suggestion and 
its statist content. A few days before the 1995 national conference, Makoa was 
to write that "one o f the most glaring features of the Basotho nation-state is its 
inability to accumulate and redistribute wealth among its population"(1995: 
14). The point that I insist on here is that this discourse panders to a "state-as- 
messiah" perspective, without proposing mechanisms by which the people can 
intercourse with the state to enforce the mandate associated with the state. It 
depends excessively on the goodwill of the state, and helps to marshall 
intellectual instruments for state’s marginalisation of the people from their 
affairs.
This axis ot argument is also followed by Matlosa (1993: 4) who characterises 
Lesotho s political predicament" since independence as "underlined by severe 
legitimacy crisis of government and lack of accountability to the electorate and 
the governed , which "are critical pillars of authoritarianism and constitutional 
impasse that still beset the country to date". Although Matlosa mentions in 
passing the lack ot organised and politically vibrant civil society in the form 
ot active opposition politics by political parties and non-governm ental 
organisations acting as pressure groups to ensure legitimacy and accountability
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of governance" (1993: 4), he fails to develop this beyond ruing lack of 
legitimacy and accountability. Leaving aside the conflation of civil society and 
political society in this statement, 1 wish only to point out that Matlosa’s 
position suffers from failure to develop a thesis o f  civil society: what should 
be the relationship between these groups and the political parties on the one 
hand and the state on the other? Instead o f tackling this question, the emphasis 
is shifted to the technical legislative and administrative dimensions of 
democratisation.
Equally worrisome is the interpretation o f the democratisation process as an 
outcome not o f  popular struggles in the country, but of "armed struggle" only 
and of the goodwill of, or international pressure on, the military ruling group 
(Matlosa 1996; Makoa 1995a)l\  Denial o f  the role of people’s groups in 
forcing change on the regime naturally leads to a deficient treatment of the role 
that people’s groups can play in the processes of restoration and entrenchment 
of democracy. Hence the focal point o f  the negotiations towards 1993 
elections was integration o f armies and (constitutional and other institutional) 
safeguards against resumption of war, and not integration of the people in the 
construction of democracy. Thus Sejanamane (1990/1: 6), one of the most 
vocal exponents o f  democracy during the transition, blamed the crisis of 
democracy on the fact that "traditional institutions of controlling the people ... 
the chieftaincy, the monarchy and the military .. have self-destructed" (see also 
Sejanamane 1996: 37). Only a month before the 1993 elections, Matlosa 
(1993: 22-23) summed up the imperatives for sustainable democracy as (i) a 
new constitution to avoid abuse o f power by a victorious party; (ii) publication 
of written election manifestos; (iii) presence of international and local elections 
monitors; (iv) acceptance o f the election results by all contesting parties; (v) 
stipulation of mechanisms and time frame for transfer of power from the 
military to an elected civilian government; and (vi) addressing the vested 
interests of the army to avoid future coups. As we now know, this entire 
repertoire o f gestures came to pass without guaranteeing a stable democracy. 
Clearly a solution must be sought elsewhere, in the concerted intervention and 
participation of the organised formations o f the citizens themselves in the 
democratisation project, along the lines other than the formalised periodic 
voting, ombudsman, law courts and newspaper columns.
The array of intellectual perspectives surveyed above formed the agenda of the 
national conference o f  1991. The boycott o f  the conference by the BCP, and
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the ambivalance and eventual withdrawal o f  the BNP, reduced the process to 
a deal of the left-leaning forces, excepting the right for reasons which have 
been discussed elsewhere (Selinyane 1996a). With the collapse of the national 
conference the parties plodded through the transition by sheer estimation of the 
likely wishes of the military and the major players, without any common 
standards to which any one of them could be held.
If any event were to be taken as the barometer o f the real content of the 
national conference, such event might be the attitude and posture o f the 
fractured leadership o f the BNP at this conference. The party entered the 
conference against a background of heated leadership contest in which an entire 
faction led by Chief N.P. Peete (who later left the BNP to form his own 
National Progressive Party) was ousted, and the faction led by Chief E.R. 
Sekhonyana foisted itself at the helm of the party in a largely controversial 
elections. The scramble by each one of the two factions of the BNP leadership 
to gain admission to the national conference as the sole authentic 
representative o f the BNP betrayed both the exclusionary focus of the 
factionalised National Executive Committee of the party, and the grasping of 
the conference as a medium for conferment o f legitimacy on the party 
leadership. Instead of referring their problems to the party membership 
democratically, the BNP leadership would rather seek absolution and 
legitimation over their members through the conference dominated by equally 
unaccountable leaders o f other parties, who had already agreed to participate 
in the Advisory Council without mandate o f  their constituencies (Pule 1990/1; 
Makoa 1990/1), and further agreed to the Lekhanya Clause10 in the proposed 
new constitution11. The contest tor "sole representation", with its obvious 
implications tor pursuit of the "sole party line", further speaks of the 
politicians’ perception of the conference as a platform for reaffirmation of the 
established "rules of the play" set by the politicians themselves without 
contending views from the other sectors of society(Selinyane 1997b). The 
abstention of the military, which had already carved for itself a comfortable 
niche in the new constitutional framework, was a final snub on the conference. 
Thus the country entered (and came out of) the 1993 elections without common 
standards worked out by the political actors (save for the broad constitutional 
framework), and without an alternative popular set of standards to be forced 
on the emergent government and enforced by the organised people's groups.
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A brief comment on the 1995 national conference will demonstrate the wimpish 
nature of the national conference as a mode of politics in Lesotho. The BCP 
government was always opposed to the national conference (Selinyane 1996a; 
Moeletsi oa Basotho  16/7/95), but entered on a non-committal, observer status. 
The ruling party intermittently recused itself during discussion of certain 
matters including suggestion to form an Independent Electoral Commisssion, 
a proposal to alter the electoral system from first-past-the post to proportional 
representation, a proposal to form a reconciliation commission to look into past 
political misdeeds; and a proposal to reduce the minimum voting age from 21 
years to 18 years. Following the split o f  the BCP which resulted in the 
formation of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) and its takeover of 
government, the parliament voluntarily lowered the voting age to 18 years and 
also amended the Constitution to provide for establishment of the Independent 
Electoral Commission without so much as a street opinion poll to test the 
views of the nation on these questions. That this populist (albeit welcome) 
posture should follow the refusal to engage these issues at the national 
conference can only convey the image the rulers had of the conference as a 
farce. Secondly, and more relevant to our case, is that once the government 
had determined the attitude o f the political leaders to these issues at the national 
conference, it felt no obligation to refer the issues to the electorate whose 
prerogative has apparently been usurped by the national conferences.
All parties across the ideological spectrum refused or failed to go beyond the 
national conference as a mode of deepening democracy in Lesotho; while a few 
parties on the left o f  the political divide consistently paid lip service to 
development of a civil society. Paradoxically the political and intellectual 
architects of the flawed transition and its aftermath were the first to express 
surprise when the democrtisation experiment failed to work (cf. Selinyane 
1997b). Civil society formations themselves abdicated their mandate to 
political parties, with dire consequences for the interests of their members.
The Lame Civil Society: W hat Legacy and What Future?
The role and posture o f civil society organs in the process of consolidation of 
democracy after 1993 have been treated in detail elsewhere (Selinyane 1996a, 
1996b). A few' general remarks can be made here. The first is that the sections 
of society which remained focused to take advantage of the democratic space
40 Civil Society & Electoral Politics
were the non-working classes. This was natural given the neo-liberal 
orientation o f the new government’s economic programme, and the global 
movement towards marketism12. The government privatisation programme 
not only gave substantial material support to the Lesotho Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (LCCI) in the form of a 4-wheel truck, office 
equipment and payment o f  office staff as part of its capacity building drive, it 
also incorporated a private sector representation on the Privatisation Advisory 
Committee whereas labour representation was brought in much later in 
response to complaints by labour federations.
This petit bourgeois civil society, however, failed to put a distinctly middle 
class programme of demands on the state, and did not benefit from democracy 
in a systematic and sustainable manner. It benefited from corruptly awarded 
contracts and other deals volunteered by the state, but failed to compel the state 
to establish the rule o f  law, and a set of standards and rules above the board 
for business to flourish, and to bind the state to provide social overheads as a 
matter of course for the benefit of the entire class, not impromptu sops for 
wayward members o f  the class (Selinyane 1996a & 1996c). To the degree that 
it failed to cast the state in its image, it failed to construct a petit bourgeois 
democracy and I argue that it failed as a civil society.
The government, from the outset, adopted an anti-worker attitude and policy 
as witnessed by the following incidents: (i) breaking of workers' march by 
baton-bearing police in May 1993; (ii) the cancellation of teachers’ salary 
increases, and imprisonment o f  striking teachers in 1995; (iii) the revocation 
of several commissions’ recommendations on the improvement of the civil 
service salary structure; (iv) the enactment of the Public Service Act of 1995 
and the Education Act o f  1995 proscribing unionisation in the teaching service 
and the public service respectively; (v) the mass dismissal o f  the Lesotho 
Telecommunications Corporations workers who went on strike against 
corruption in the corporation; (vi) the massacre of striking employees of the 
Lesotho Highlands Project Contractors (LHPC) by the police, which was 
publicly praised by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Home Affairs 
responsible among others for the police.
The fate o f  the working classes’ civil society in this milieu is best demonstrated 
by the attitude o f  the national NGO coalition - the Lesotho Council o f  NGOs 
(LCN) - to these incidents. Formed in 1990, in an era of general economic
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depression, escalating poverty, and spiralling state-generated violence (Thabane 
1990/1; Mclvor 1990/1), this organisation was dominated by charitable and 
crisis-focused organisations from its birth. Indeed these were to be the 
characterising sectors in which the LC.N operated ever since. It was through 
the LCN that the October 1991 conference was held, and it was through it that 
calls for the second conference o f September 1995 came. The organisation 
also convened a national crisis resolution forum after the urban towns of the 
country were engulfed by racial tension-cum-violence in May 1991; it took part 
in the monitoring o f the 1993 general elections and several by-elections 
thereafter, and it was through it that drought relief was distributed in the 
transition and in subsequent food-shortage periods. The donor funding that 
these involvements attracted, and the readiness of the state and donors to deal 
with the LCN as the "mother body" o f all community organisations in the 
country, soon led the leadership of the LCN to declare themsleves as the sole 
and authentic representatives o f civil society in Lesotho. This is the slant in 
which the LCN entered the era o f democratic reconstruction following the 1993 
elections.
Owing to a number o f problems associated with the transition (Selinyane 
1997a) and the very nature of the ruling group (Pule 1997) the post-1993 era 
was riddled with crises, whose resolution tested the maturity of the country’s 
civil society. During the January 1994 army debacle, the NGO coalition not 
only deplored the intra-military skirmishes and chastised opportunist politicians 
for fanning suspicions and cleavages in the army, but also lambasted the 
government for its regular taunts against all sectors of the public service, which 
kindled the wrath o f  virtually all societal groups. The LCN intervened during 
the short-lived palace coup o f August 1994 by leading two national strikes to 
force the king to restore the elected (BCP) government. The coup was a 
watershed in the short history o f  the LCN. Some observers have remarked 
that even though it is ultimately fair to attribute the civil disobedience of the 
crisis time to LCN leadership, it was the Democracy and Human Rights 
Commission of the organisation that pulled this endeavour, at the time when 
the LCN leadership was torn assunder by political loyalties on the two sides 
ot the coup, thereby injecting inertia into the organisation’s functioning 
structures (Selinyane 1996b).
After the restoration o f government the attitude of the LCN leadership to the 
struggles of the working classes and pro-democracy organisations was to be
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decidedy reactionary, seeing every civil struggle as destabilising "our 
government". The exact mechanisms by which the "hegemony of reaction" was 
attained in the LCN are discussed elsewhere (Selinyane 1996b; Selinyane and 
Neocosmos 1998). The coalition refused to support the 1995 teachers’ strike, 
despite appeals from the affiliated Lesotho Teachers Trade Union (LTTU) 
which led the strike. The LCN further remained nonchalant to the LHPC 
massacre13. In an interview with Sehoai Santho, a founder-member and 
ertstwhile president o f  the LCN in 1996, he stated that the LCN never saw its 
role as shaping a political consensus among its affiliates, but to provide an 
enabling environment for affiliates to pursue their goals. The LCN Programme 
Officer Palesa T s ’oene said during the same period that the LCN sees its 
function as "keeping the lines of communication with the government open", 
and leaves politics and political questions to its politically-oriented affiliates14, 
even though it might participate in resolving national crises.
The civil society body never prescribed a role for itself in the process of 
building democracy. Hence while the LCN crisis forum of June 1991 resolved 
among others, that the ultimate solution to the recurring national crises "is the 
democratisation of the political life o f Lesotho |through] establishment of an 
accountable political system governed by a democratic constitution, which 
protects human rights ... a bill of rights... and the independence of a free 
media safeguard" (resolution 17), it never defined what role the people in their 
organised formations were to play in this process. It remained within the 
framework of the discourse which I have criticised above, in short ineffectual 
as a building block of meaningful democracy. Anything approximating the role 
of the people was to be found in the reference to "a development oriented 
national education system which also prepares Basotho students to be aware of 
their rights in a participatory democracy" (resolution 21).
It is fair to conclude that despite its charitable role the LCN avoided 
constituting itself as a platform for mobilisation o f its constituents to assert 
themsleves on the state. What the LCN has achieved, however, is to secure 
a place for itself in the bosom of the state and the donor circle. In February 
1997 the coalition’s annual meeting resolved to encourage the government to 
pass legislation to regulate the activites of the NGOs in the country under the 
pretext that this was already done elsewhere, and that the state would do the 
same anyway it the coalition did not initiate it. In December 1997 it convened 
a workshop which successfully brokered a compromise between the Lesotho
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Highlands Water Project and the affected communities of the project area, 
allowing for commencement o f Phase IB of the project despite outstanding 
claims of the vitimised communities15. There is a real possibility that through 
the LCN the state-donor pact could find a way to incorporate popualr classes 
in a subordinate postion. The state seems more comfortable dealing with the 
LCN than with dispersed "unruly" segments of civil society. The LCN 
bureaucracy sees itself as members of a larger brotherhood belonging together 
with their state and donor counterparts in the processs of delivering 
development.
The LCN however does not have monopoly representation of civil society, 
indeed organisations affiliated to this coalition have acted independently despite 
its pretensions to represent all its members in its prevaricatory stance in the 
face of state repression o f these sections. There were a number of independent 
initiatives, notably industrial strikes, not at all enjoying the support of the LCN 
in the early years o f  elected government. Worthy o f mention here are the 
Lesotho Amalgamation, Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (LACTWU) 
strikes in the Maputsoe industrial area. These strikes however, failed to 
translate into worker political consciousness and, as is usual with labour 
organisations in Lesotho, the union was considerably weakened by internal 
power scuffles and misappropriation o f  union finances. Besides these, there 
were the Lesotho Pharmaceutical Corporation workers’ strikes which targeted 
both unpalatable conditions of employment and state-bolstered corruption in the 
corporation; and the five-union protest march against the Public Service Bill 
in 1995. This march was condemned by the Lesotho Federation of Democratic 
Unions, which was reputed as the more progressive of the two labour 
federations; while the Lesotho Trades Union Congress (LTUC) expressed 
support for the protest. The LFDU position was widely assumed to be 
informed by the BCP credentials o f  most of its office holders, while the main 
influence behind the LTUC is its secretary Moletsane Jonathan, a veteran 
leader of pro-BNP federations (of. Southall 1984). It is suspect therefore 
whether such seemingly progressive stance could be taken against a non-BCP 
government by a federation o f the qualifications of LTUC.
As the 1998 elections draw near, civil society organisations are again adopting 
dramatic postures in preparation for the national poll. The Lesotho Teachers 
Trade Union has drawn a programme o f  political demands as a minimum basis 
on which the union can proffer a bloc vote to political parties, possibly by
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striking a formal alliance with a party which promises to deliver on the 
demands presented by the union. The Lesotho Clothing and Allied Workers 
Union (LECAWU) has also posted an election candidate in the industrial 
constituency o f Ha Thetsane. The newly-formed eight-member Congress of 
Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU), to which both unions are affiliated, 
resolved at its lauch meeting to evolve a workers’ charter as a basis for seeking 
tactical alliances with political parties in the elections. No general prognosis 
can be made about the future of civil society in these circumstances, nor is 
there need for such an effort. Whether the heretofore oppressed sections of 
civil society will both contribute to strengthening of democracy and maximise 
their share o f benefits from democracy, depends on whether they will opt for 
incorporation into state or a distance between themselves and the state, to allow 
themselves to make and enforce their class-specific demands on the state.
This requires that these organisations must device new ways in which they 
interact first with the political parties, and second with the state. It does not 
require disengagement from the mainstream methods like regular elections, 
parliamentarian representation and lobbying of the members o f  parliament. 
What it does require, however, is the organised independence o f the subject 
groups; self-awareness of their members as belonging primarily to specific 
division of labour groups, and only secondarily to political parties; and 
organised interaction with parties on the terms prescribed by these groups 
themselves. Attaintment of this end will take discipline, submission to 
members’ voice and collective action, intolerance to corruption and to elitist 
methods of presenting and discussing critical questions. If the people are not 
systematically introduced to the "modern", "complex" and often obfuscating 
ways o4-' doing things, they must insist that things be done in ways that they 
themselves understand and prefer. Only then will peoples’ power and popular 
perspectives prevail and civil society survive the current modes of democracy 
and simultaneously contribute to constituting new types which transform lives 
of the majority o f people for the better. The "search for new modes of 
politics" (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1994a) is a lifelong venture from which the most 
disadvantaged groups cannot afford the luxury o f taking a break.
Conclusion
In this article I have looked at the possibilities for civil society in Lesotho’s 
politics and the opportunities ot construction o f democracy out of an exuberant
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civil society. I have argued that the proximity of the division of labour 
organisations to the political parties and the state has rendered it impossible for 
these organisations to influence the state to serve their interests, and to avoid 
incorporation into the state as partners in curtailment of the rights of their 
constituents. The 1980s and 1990s have, however, witnessed emergence of a 
new type of organisations, especially among trade unions, which seek to tackle 
the political condition o f the social constituencies they represent. These have, 
however, not always survived the vices o f  undemocratic leadership culture and 
financial irresponsibility which typified the first (pro-BCP) and second 
generation (pro-BNP) organisations. Enhancing the prospects of change will 
depend on the deepening of accountability and membership participation at the 
organisation level, and deliberate prescription o f the terms on which collective 
support to political parties, and participation in the political processes can be 
pursued in the interests o f  the underprivileged groups.
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Endnotes:
1. I am indebted to M acpherson (1973) for this term.
2. The long running debate surrounding "civil society" and the state/party relations in the 
context o f  South Africa in the period leading to the first democratic elections clearly 
reflects this. The debate has been characterised by bourgeoisification o f  the concept and 
desire to subordinate peop le’s organisations to party and stale control (Nzim ande and 
Sikhosana, 1992) on the one side; and desire to have civic formations performing a 
"watchdog" role and pressing the state to respond to their demands on the other 
(M ayekiso 1992 and 1993). These exchanges have unfortunately not touched the political 
role o f  the civ il society , even though the debate is apparently about this question. While 
N zim ande and others want to control civil so c ie ty ’s political potential and fate, the 
c iv ic s ’ position as epitom ised in M ayekiso remains that o f  "barking" at the state when 
it goes wrong. As to the role o f  civil society in qualitatively transforming the content of 
state-soeiety relations, this remains to be sorted out.
3 .  It is necessary to point out that "incorporation" here does not mean formal affiliation or 
assim ilation into the BCP. T hese organisations retained their organisational integrity, but 
were conscioulsy  pro-BCP in a way that made them not critical o f  the approaches o f the 
party to national issues.
4. N eville  Pule correctly objects that the term / concept o f  transition is usually used in the 
discussion o f  the present conjunture (especially  in relation to civil society and 
dem ocracy) without even a pretence at problematisation o f  this term / concept. I agree 
entirely with this objection and its import, but space precludes problematisation here. I 
use the term to denote the expectations that processes initiated in the late 1980s in 
Lesotho and elsew here would lead to qualitatively different m odes o f  rule. Whether 
circum stances justified  the coining o f  the term when it was first used, and whether later 
developm ents demand that w e qualify the term, cannot be treated here for reasons of 
space.
5 .  T his was im m ediately taken advantage o f  by local elites w ho started churning NGOs to 
cash in on the new w isdom . At a national forum convenned in June 1991 by the Lesotho 
Council o f  Non-Governm ental Organisations (L C N ), one o f  the resolutions read: "The 
forum agreed on the need to review  donor assistance programmes to Lesotho with a view 
to prioritising the key areas o f  focus in the developm ent o f  Lesotho. Such development 
assistance should increasingly use NGOs as alternative channels o f  assistance to the 
grassroots given the lack o f  an effective developm ent oriented system  o f  governance".
6 .  Studies show  that adjustment programmes have been used by O EC D  countries to 
strengthen their position in international markets and weaken developing countries 
challenge to the unequal relations of the international d ivision o f  labour (Bullock and
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Parfitt, 1990; W atkins 1991; Harriss 1988;). In som e (rather rare) instances adjustment 
has been used as instrument o f  battle in trade by the western countries among theselvcs 
(Stiles 1990).
7 . For history o f  debates and reasons for renewed interest in civil society see Keane (1988); 
Gibbon (1995).
8. Incidentally, instead o f  the people, it was the intellectuals (c .g  M atlosa 1996) who 
celebrated the military as saviours o f  the people, as pointed out in Note 8 below.
9. W itness M atlosa’s (1996: 4) assertion: "The military retired gracefully to the barracks 
and allowed free political activity which facilitated the general election o f  the same year 
(i.e  1993 - N PS) (Em phasis added).
10. A clause w hich the then Chairman o f  the Military' Council insisted on, providing for 
presence o f  the C om m ander o f  the Armed Forces in an clected civilian parliament, as 
a custodian o f  the constitution, to guard against political squabbles which might foment 
future military' coups. T his would retain the real power in national affairs in the hands 
o f  the unelected military behind the facade o f  a dem ocratically constituted dispensation.
1 1. One political party could not be represented by two factions holding different positions 
on various questions o f  the transition. The conference was about striking a deal among 
the political e lites, not about a d ialogue o f  the different groups o f citizens - hence the 
conference bad to ascertain there was a single leader o f  each party delegation who could  
speak with Finality on the issues at stake and quicken the conclusion o f  the inter-party 
deal. As long as com m itm ent o f  each party to the deal could be guaranteed, whatever 
view point o f  the ordinary people em erged outside the context ol the conference seemed  
im material.
12. The C om m onw ealth  Harare Declaration o f  October 1991, emphasised both the 
imperative o f  elected governm ent under multi party political system , and a commitment 
to free market inacro-econim c policies as the touchstone ol good government. The BC P 
1993 election  m anifesto, in its turn, made a strong commitment to privatisation, 
deregulation, and trade liberalisation.
13. At a sem inar I hosted on "The Role o f  C ivil Society in the Political and Econom ic 
D evelopm ent o f  Lesotho" on 6 /1 2 /9 6  at the British Council Hall m Maseru, the then 
President o f  the LCN P.J. Lerotholi admitted the weakness of the LCN to take up 
struggles o f  its constituents, and blamed this on political bickering within the 
organisation. On the teachers’ strike, the fo llow ing note by the LC N s Dem ocracy and 
Human Rights C om m ission  to the Secretariat ol the organisation is instructive. 
"Follow ing the unsatisfactory way in which the two executing arm (sic) ol the LCN  
namely the E xecutive C om m ittee and the Secretariat handled the teachers strike the
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C om m ission  recom m ends that the affectcd representative o f  the relevant com m ission he 
requested to attend an E xecutive Committee m eeting as an observer so that the 
sentim ents o f  the affected constituency are w ell ventilated. At tim es o f  crisis, the 
com m ission  w ill issue a statement or will establish a steering com m ittee to deal with 
such crisis." (M em orandum  from Democracy and Human Rights C om m ission to the
LCN Secretariat, dated July 25th, 1995).
T hese would include organisations like the Lesotho Human Rights Alert Group; the 
Federation o f  W om en Lawyers; the Community Legal R esource and A dvice Centre, and 
others.
In a conversation with one o f  the co-ordinators o f  the workshop, he divulged that the 
main reason for not seeking to halt tine project pending satisfaction o f  the adversely 
affected com m unities, was that the NGO coalition needed funding from the Project for 
m onitoring the activities ol the project sic).
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